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Undue Burdens and Potential Opportunities in Voting 
Rights and Abortion Law 
PAMELA S. KARLAN* 
Reaching for the world, as our lives do, 
As all lives do, reaching that we may give 
The best of what we are and hold as true: 
Always it is by bridges that we live.1 
 
One of the problems with the way we have tried to build a more just constitutional 
law is our failure to see, and then to make the most of, doctrinal connections across 
constitutional subfields—that is, to build constitutional bridges. This Essay seeks to 
build one such bridge between two areas of legal doctrine that might seem relatively 
disconnected from one another: voting rights and reproductive justice.2 
Many years ago, I joked about one aspect of that connection: “Redistricting, like 
reproduction, combines lofty goals, deep passions about identity and instincts for 
self-preservation, increasing reliance on technology, and often a need to ‘pull [and] 
haul’ rather indelicately at the very end. And of course, it often involves somebody 
getting screwed.”3 But the connection between them is actually more profound—and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *  Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law 
School, and Co-Director, Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. I thank Viola 
Canales and Kate Fetrow for many helpful conversations along the way and the participants 
at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law and American Constitution Society sympo-
sium on the Future of the U.S. Constitution. At the time the symposium was conceived and I 
started work on this Essay, the future looked rather different than it did after the election of 
2016. I take my inspiration from the directive in the Pirkei Avot that “[y]ou are not required 
to complete the work, but neither are you at liberty to abstain from it.” CENTRAL CONFERENCE 
OF AM. RABBIS, GATES OF PRAYER: THE NEW UNION PRAYERBOOK 20 (1975). It may take 
longer than I initially thought, or hoped, for constitutional law to revisit questions of economic 
equality more broadly, but this Essay seeks at least to begin that process. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I note that I participated directly in several cases discussed in this Essay: Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (as counsel for the petitioners); Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (as counsel for amicus curiae California Medical Association); 
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (as 
counsel for the United States during my time at the Department of Justice), cert. denied, 137 
S. Ct. 1399 (2017); and Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (same), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017). 
 1. PHILIP LARKIN, Bridge for the Living, in COLLECTED POEMS 189 (Anthony Thwaite 
ed., 2003). 
 2. In an earlier contribution to the Indiana Law Journal, I tried to build another such 
bridge. I used themes developed in the religion clause cases—that “[f]ree people are entitled 
to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain nor to direct”; that 
the Constitution should combat the creation of an outsider class; and that judicial review 
should prevent capture and exploitation of the machinery of government—to suggest how we 
ought to think about regulating political parties, redistricting, and campaign finance. Pamela 
S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases 
Illuminate the Law of Democracy?, 83 IND. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2008). 
 3. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 
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potentially more promising. First, a citizen’s right to vote and a woman’s right to 
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy share a distinctive structure: they are rights-
creating rights that lie at the intersection of the liberty and equality values expressed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, these two rights have been subject to a simi-
lar doctrinal evolution over the last half century, as the Supreme Court first ratcheted 
up and then relaxed the level of judicial scrutiny; both are now subject to an undue 
burden standard. That doctrinal retrenchment has, rightly, been subject to withering 
criticism. Finally, in several recent cases, courts have begun to analyze burdens on 
voting rights and access to abortion in ways that take account of how people actually 
live and that account for the interaction between the challenged restrictions and so-
cioeconomic disadvantage. This emerging, more muscular understanding of undue 
burden allows us an opportunity, within the confines of current constitutional doc-
trine, to talk about how economic inequality and poverty undermine constitutional 
values of self-determination, liberty, and equality. Perhaps these undue burden cases 
can become an opening wedge in litigation over the Constitution and what equal 
opportunity should mean more generally. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL AND STEREOSCOPIC RIGHTS 
To call the entitlement to do (or to resist doing) something a “right” is to give that 
entitlement special force.4 All constitutional rights, almost by definition, thus express 
important commitments. That being said, voting rights and abortion rights have a 
form of what Kenneth Karst has called “analytical primacy.”5 
The Supreme Court long ago declared the right to vote “fundamental” because it 
is “preservative of all rights.”6 The ordinary way in which individuals acquire most 
rights or protect the rights they already have is through the political processes of self-
government. Particularly given the fact that the U.S. Constitution confers few affirm-
ative rights directly, virtually all of the important social and economic rights that 
Americans enjoy today are the product of legislation passed by elected officials. 
Rights to health care are provided through Medicare and Medicaid and the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act; workers’ rights are protected through 
the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and Title 
VII; the right to a clean environment is protected by the Clean Water Act and the 
Clean Air Act.7 Under existing doctrine, none of these rights are protected fully and 
                                                                                                                 
 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1998) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)). 
 4. LEIF WENAR, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5.1 (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights [https://perma.cc/M28X-
MHP2].  
 5. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1977) (applying this concept to 
the right to vote) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship]. Karst later offered a parallel assess-
ment of reproductive autonomy. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 
89 YALE L.J. 624, 659–64 (1980).  
 6. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 7. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (upholding a federal stat-
ute that enabled Puerto Rican voters to cast ballots without having to be literate in English “as 
a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory 
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directly by the Constitution, and none of these statutes were constitutionally com-
pelled.8 These rights are protected because citizens elected public officials who voted 
to enact laws conferring particular entitlements. 
Even rights that lie at the core of our constitutional culture are often given real 
force only once elected officials intervene. Brown v. Board of Education9 is surely 
the most celebrated case in modern constitutional law. And yet, the Supreme Court’s 
decision achieved virtually no desegregation on its own.10 Only after Congress en-
acted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare threatened to cut off federal funds to recalcitrant districts did 
school systems begin to comply with the constitutional command.11 
Ironically, the same is true of the right to vote itself. The most robust protections 
of that right have come from legislation and not from courts acting on their own to 
enforce constitutional commands. For example, although the Fifteenth Amendment 
forbids denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,12 virtually all black 
citizens in the South were disenfranchised for decades. Litigation was slow and only 
minimally successful until Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.13 Federal 
examiners authorized by a provision in that Act added more black citizens in the 
South to the voting rolls in two years than had been registered in the entire preceding 
century.14 Litigation under sections 2 and 5 of the Act transformed the composition 
of school boards, city councils, and legislatures throughout the nation, ultimately 
transforming policies as well.15 
And even rights that courts do locate expressly in the Constitution are, in reality, 
shaped by elections at one or two steps’ remove. The judges themselves, after all, are 
                                                                                                                 
 
treatment by government—both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or 
administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law en-
forcement”). 
 8. As opposed to, for example, the constitutional command that Congress provide for a 
census every ten years, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, or that each house keep, and publish, a 
“Journal of its Proceedings,” id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10. Roughly a decade after Brown, only 2.3% of black children in the South attended a 
school with any white students. Case Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School 
Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 322 (1967).  
 11. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2012). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). Section 2 of the amendment gives Congress “power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.” Id. amend XV, § 2. As the text indicates, effective 
enfranchisement of African Americans has depended on congressional enforcement of section 
1’s prohibition. 
 13. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
 14. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 21 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
 15. For two wide-ranging discussions, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 379–382 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman 
eds., 1994); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING 
RIGHTS 30–33 (2010).  
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either elected (in the overwhelming majority of states) or (at the federal level) nom-
inated and appointed by people who are. As recent work by Reva Siegel and David 
Cole has shown, judicial constitutional interpretations are the products of complex 
political and social forces that often originate in popular movements and political 
activity.16 For anyone who was under the illusion that constitutional interpretation is 
sealed off from voting, the election of 2016, which placed Neil Gorsuch on the 
Supreme Court rather than Merrick Garland, offers a sobering lesson. The kind of 
constitutional doctrine we will have in the future will be shaped by the kinds of 
Presidents who nominate judges, and the kinds of Senators who confirm them. Who 
votes, and how, will determine who interprets the Constitution.17 
The ability to control one’s reproductive capacity is also a rights-protecting right. 
“The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart” of a “cluster 
of constitutionally protected choices” that are themselves treated as fundamental.18 
A person who lacks the right to make that decision will be circumscribed in how she 
exercises all the other rights tied to reproduction and family formation. And even 
beyond the way in which reproductive autonomy is preservative of that constellation 
of fundamental constitutional rights, it is preservative of a “basic control over [one’s] 
life.”19 Modern America offers its residents a panoply of choices, but “a woman must 
have control over her own maternity in order to control her future: education, work, 
marriage, the support of other children, or any life plan she might have.”20 
Voting rights and abortion rights share another distinctive characteristic: they are 
“stereoscopic,” lying at the intersection of the liberty and equality interests protected 
by adjacent clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment.21 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (explaining how recent marriage equality and gun rights deci-
sions are the product of social movements and political activism influencing how courts inter-
pret the Equal Protection Clause and the Second Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: 
Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 201 (2008) (ex-
ploring the role of popular constitutionalism in the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment de-
cision). See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (exploring how ultimate control over con-
stitutional interpretation in the long run is a product of politics). 
 17.  Cf. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901), http://tinyurl.com 
/FPDunne-MrDooley [https://perma.cc/TM9C-DMMR] (providing the original source for the 
statement that the Supreme Court follows the election returns). Given its various interventions, 
“[t]oday, the Court produces the election system almost as much as the election system pro-
duces the Court.” Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 521, 522 (1996). 
 18. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (pointing to the right to 
marry, the right to procreate, rights involving family relationships, and the right to control over 
child rearing). 
 19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 20. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process 
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 125 (2007). 
 21. I first developed the concept of “stereoscopic” rights in Pamela S. Karlan, Equal 
Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
473 (2002). The Supreme Court invoked a similar idea in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
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Rights are conventionally framed as a species of individual liberty to be protected 
by the Due Process Clause.22 Voting rights and access to abortion, however, are not 
simply about individual autonomy untethered from social realities. These liberty in-
terests are bound up in considerations of equality as well. 
Voting has both individual and aggregative dimensions. With respect to the for-
mer, the right to vote is a fundamental public expression of equal citizenship and 
dignity.23 That dignitary interest matters without regard to the outcome of any par-
ticular election.24 But the right to vote also gains much of its importance from the 
way in which it determines winners and losers, and ultimately public policy, by 
adding votes together. This aspect of voting is necessarily about groups of citizens 
who share common political preferences, which may themselves be the product of 
other characteristics the citizens share.25 And when some groups have more oppor-
tunity than other groups to affect election outcomes, this becomes a question of 
equality, not just liberty. Cases involving claims of racial vote dilution, unconstitu-
tional political gerrymandering, malapportionment, or excessive reliance on race in 
the redistricting process are cases about voting rights that inherently sound in one 
form of equality or another.26 The upshot, as put succinctly by Dean Chemerinsky, 
is that “the Supreme Court repeatedly has declared that the right to vote is a  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
(1954), to explain why the federal government could not segregate schools in the District of 
Columbia. That day, the Court had held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
that racial segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That amendment binds only the states. The Fifth Amendment, by contrast, binds the federal 
government but does not contain an equal protection clause. The Court explained that because 
the concepts of equal protection and due process “both stem[] from our American ideal of 
fairness,” the Fifth Amendment prohibits “discrimination” that is “unjustifiable.” Bolling, 347 
U.S. at 499. 
 22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (further explaining that the 
Due Process Clause “also provides heightened protection against government interference 
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests”). 
 23. For discussions of this point, see Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual 
Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1334–36 (2011); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some 
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–11 (1993); Karst, Equal 
Citizenship, supra note 5, at 28–30.  
 24. See, e.g., Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering a new election 
because voting booths had been racially segregated, even though the segregation did not nec-
essarily affect the outcome of the election, because “gross, unsophisticated, significant, and 
obvious racial discriminations” tainted the election). 
 25. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (pointing out that “groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do 
not”). I develop a tripartite taxonomy of the interests involved in voting—participation, ag-
gregation, and governance—in Karlan, supra note 23, at 1709–20. 
 26. That doctrinal categorization was in part strategic. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, 
The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1508–09 (2002) (suggesting that in Harper v. 
State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)—the case in which the Supreme Court began 
to ratchet up the level of scrutiny—the Court “self-consciously aligned itself on the opposite 
side of [the] now-reviled [Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which had relied on 
substantive due process and] squarely on the more righteous [Equal Protection Clause-based] 
trajectory” that had led to “Brown v. Board of Education and beyond”). 
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fundamental right protected under equal protection.”27 
But as the list of potential equality claims shows, voting rights doctrine has been 
driven by more than the notion of abstract equality that lies at the heart of one person, 
one vote. It is impossible to understand virtually any aspect of constitutional voting 
rights doctrine without taking account of the struggle for racial equality. Much of the 
law has focused directly on questions of racial justice, precisely because racial mi-
norities have so often borne the brunt of restrictions on the right to vote or of electoral 
arrangements that operate “designedly or otherwise” to “cancel out the voting 
strength” of particular “elements of the voting population.”28 And even doctrines that 
are not on their face directed at racial equality often originated in concerns about it.29 
It is impossible to explain the trajectory of U.S. voting rights law without taking race 
into account.30 
The entwinement of liberty and group equality is equally at the core of abortion 
rights. Here, too, in its foundational decision in Roe v. Wade,31 the Supreme Court 
invoked the liberty of each individual protected by the Due Process Clause as the 
source of constitutional protection for a woman’s right to make the decision whether 
to terminate a pregnancy. But from the very outset, supporters of abortion rights also 
pressed the claim that abortion was critical to women’s equality as well.32 Women 
can attain full equality in the public sphere only if they can control their fertility, and 
access to abortion remains a critical element of that control. Thus, in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,33 the joint opinion of Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter pointed to the fact that “[t]he ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 893–94 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
 28. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
 29. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy, 67 ALA. 
L. REV. 415, 416–21 (2015) (discussing this connection between racial equality and the 
Supreme Court’s imposition of one person, one vote). That connection may actually be quite 
a bit deeper. The first federal requirement for equipopulous districting appeared in the first 
apportionment bill after the Civil War. See An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives 
to Congress Among the Several States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28 
(1872). A central focus of that Act, and the debate leading up to it, was how to ensure political 
equality for newly freed slaves in the South. See George David Zuckerman, A Consideration 
of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 93, 107–116 (1961) (discussing the legislative history of the Act). 
 30.  For a striking recent example, consider Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), 
which involved a challenge to North Carolina’s congressional district map. Every member of 
the Court agreed that racial and political considerations were closely tied to one another; they 
disagreed only over whether racial concerns predominated over political ones, or vice versa. 
Compare id. at 1473–74 (opinion of the Court), with id. at 1503–04 (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 32. For three celebrated examples, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Kenneth L. 
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 659–64 (1980); Sylvia A. Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). 
 33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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by their ability to control their reproductive lives”34 and that “[a]n entire generation 
has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of 
women to act in society” as a reason to reaffirm Roe’s central holding.35 Justice 
Ginsburg has even more directly linked abortion rights to a “woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”36 
The fundamental role of both voting and control over one’s fertility in enabling 
full and equal participation in civic life led the Supreme Court, during the early 
1970s, to demand heightened scrutiny of laws that restricted these two rights. With 
respect to voting, the Court declared that “if a challenged statute grants the right to 
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, ‘the Court must determine 
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.’”37 That 
is the language of strict scrutiny. With respect to abortion, the Court actually quoted  
its earlier voting rights decision that laws limiting “fundamental rights” could “be 
justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’”38 and required that restrictions on ac-
cess to abortion “must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state inter-
ests at stake.”39 In both areas, then, the normal presumption of constitutionality was 
abandoned in favor of deep judicial skepticism. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts retreated dramatically from the strict scrutiny 
regimes in both voting rights and abortion rights cases. In their place, the Court an-
nounced standards that asked whether the challenged law imposes an undue burden 
on the underlying right. Those tests abandoned the presumption that restrictions on 
the right to vote, or on a woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy, deserved 
searching judicial review. They replaced them with a fluid inquiry in which the 
Justices often substituted intuition for rigorous analysis of the purpose and effect of 
the challenged regulations.40  
The retreat in voting rights began in Burdick v. Takushi,41 where the Supreme 
Court upheld Hawaii’s refusal to permit write-in voting—an unusual provision, and 
far removed from the sort of restriction on the franchise that had prompted the 
Court’s adoption of heightened scrutiny. The Court rejected the idea that “a law that 
imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.”42 That 
requirement, the Court declared, would too stringently “tie the hands” of the states, 
because every election law “will invariably impose some burden upon individual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Id. at 856 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
 35. Id. at 860. 
 36. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 37. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)). 
 38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627). 
 39. Id. 
 40. For a general discussion of undue burden standards across a wide array of constitu-
tional issues, see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden 
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994). 
 41. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 42. Id. at 432. 
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voters.”43 So the Court borrowed the more “flexible” standard it had earlier applied 
to laws restricting candidates’ access to the ballot.44 Under that standard, a reviewing 
court  
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plain-
tiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into 
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff's rights.”45  
Only if the burdens are “severe” must the restriction be “narrowly drawn to advance 
a state interest of compelling importance.”46 Otherwise, a state’s “‘important regula-
tory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”47 
Burdick was announced during what was, in retrospect, one of the high-water 
marks of voting rights in the United States.48 Many of the traditional restrictions on 
the right to vote—poll taxes, literacy tests, various restrictive registration practices—
had either been struck down by the Supreme Court or abolished by federal law.49 
And the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act kept many 
jurisdictions that had had a history of restrictions on the right to vote from enacting 
new ones. Moreover, the restriction in Burdick did not bar individuals from voting 
altogether; nor, as an empirical matter, did it seem to systematically prevent identi-
fiable groups of voters from electing candidates of their choice. 
Shortly after the turn of the century, however, the United States began to experi-
ence a wave of voting restrictions that did pose those threats of disenfranchisement 
and group disempowerment: the “new vote denial.”50 In the first of these cases to 
reach the Supreme Court, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,51 the Court 
applied the Burdick framework, rather than strict scrutiny. The case concerned 
Indiana’s voter ID law, which required voters to present currently valid, government-
issued photo identification in order to cast a ballot that would be counted. Justice 
Stevens’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court insisted that “‘evenhanded 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Id. at 433. 
 44. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983)). 
 45. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 46. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 47. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
 48. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 295–98 (rev. ed. 2009) (showing that the right to vote 
has expanded and contracted across American history). 
 49. For example, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolished poll taxes for federal elec-
tions, and the Supreme Court then struck them down for all other elections. See Harper v. Va. 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). Congress permanently prohibited all literacy tests 
nationwide in 1970. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10501 (2015). For examples of cases striking down restric-
tive residency requirements, see, for example, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
 50. The phrase was introduced by Professor Dan Tokaji. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote 
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 692 (2006). 
 51. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself’ are 
not invidious.”52 For most voters, even most voters currently lacking acceptable 
forms of ID, he thought the burdens imposed by the statute were relatively minor. 
And because the case was before the Court on a facial, pre-enforcement challenge, 
there was nothing in the record “to quantify . . . the magnitude of the burden” on the 
“narrow class of voters” who might experience a “special burden” under the statute 
due to “economic or other personal limitations.”53 
On the other side of the ledger, Justice Stevens credited several interests the State 
had advanced. For present purposes, the two most salient were preventing voter fraud 
and promoting voter confidence. The Justice’s discussion of fraud prevention veered 
perilously close to the most toothless form of rationality review. He acknowledged 
that the “only kind of voter fraud” that a photo ID requirement could prevent is in-
person voter impersonation at the polls.54 And he conceded that there was “no evi-
dence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”55 
But he pointed to “infamous examples” of such fraud in nineteenth-century New 
York,56 some “scattered instances of in-person voter fraud” in other states more re-
cently,57 and one example of absentee-ballot fraud in an Indiana municipal election 
to conclude that “not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the 
outcome of a close election.”58 Given these anecdotes, he implied that a state might 
somehow rationally adopt voter identification requirements to protect the integrity 
of its elections against the possibility that some form of in-person impersonation 
fraud might emerge in the future. 
One step further removed was the State’s interest in “protecting public confi-
dence” in that integrity.59 Justice Stevens saw “independent significance” in this in-
terest “because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.”60 A 
few Terms later, the Court went even further, in vacating preliminary relief against 
an Arizona voter ID law: 
Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and 
breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes 
will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. “[T]he 
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Id. at 189–90 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9). Justice Stevens wrote for him-
self, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy. Since Justice Scalia’s opinion for himself, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Alito would have upheld the challenged statute after looking at the impact 
of the law on “voters generally,” id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis 
in original), rather than by considering its impact on the voters most affected, it is fair to treat 
Justice Stevens’s opinion, to the extent it upheld the law, as controlling. 
 53. Id. at 199–200 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
 54. Id. at 194. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 195 n.11. 
 57. Id. at 195 n.12. 
 58. Id. at 196. 
 59. Id. at 197. 
 60. Id. 
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of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”61  
In other words, states are entitled to protect the rights of voters who would otherwise 
“feel” disenfranchised by actually disenfranchising some number of their citizens. 
There is simply no way to reconcile the Court’s extraordinary deference in 
Crawford and Purcell with its earlier skepticism about voting restrictions, particu-
larly in light of Justice Stevens’s recognition that “partisan considerations may have 
played a significant role” in the Republican-dominated legislature’s decision to im-
pose the new ID requirement.62 Even after acknowledging that such motivations 
standing alone would be as “invidious” as the inadequate justifications for “the poll 
tax at issue in Harper [v. State Board of Elections],”63 the Justice did not ask the 
normal next question in constitutional law: would the challenged ID requirement 
have been adopted in the absence of that impermissible motive? Both in its approach 
to what counts as a burden that should prompt judicial skepticism and in its explana-
tion of how to determine whether that burden is “undue”—that is, cannot be justified 
by the State’s asserted interests—Crawford threatened abandonment of meaningful 
judicial scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court’s retreat on abortion rights followed a similar trajectory. Even 
before the Court formally changed the standard in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania  v. Casey,64 the Court had stopped “rigidly insisting upon 
‘compelling interests’ and ‘narrow tailoring,’” instead “essentially pass[ing] upon 
the ‘reasonableness’ of individual regulations from case to case.”65 In Casey, ex-
pressly drawing on the same election-law decisions that were that Term beginning to 
reshape its voting rights jurisprudence, the controlling joint opinion of Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter emphasized that “not every law which makes a right 
more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right” because states 
are entitled to “substantial flexibility.”66 Accordingly, the Justices abandoned con-
ventional strict scrutiny for a different test: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)) (alteration in original). 
 62. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203. 
 63. Id. at 203. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (holding that 
“‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may 
vote is constitutionally impermissible”). For a discussion of the partisan motivations behind 
many contemporary voting restrictions, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM 
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (discussing the increased partisan-
ship in election administration); Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370 
(2015) (“[T]he single predictor necessary to determine whether a state will impose voter-ac-
cess restrictions is whether Republicans control the ballot-access process.”); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 
763, 786–89 (2016).  
 64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 65. David D. Meyer, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J.L. 
& POL’Y 57, 62 (2008). 
 66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
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The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to 
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more diffi-
cult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to inval-
idate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a 
woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach 
into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.67 
The new undue burden test depended on a form of balancing. A state was entitled 
to regulate abortions up to the point at which its regulation “has the purpose or effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”68 As with the Anderson-Burdick standard for restrictions on voting, 
the real action would come in deciding what counted as a “substantial obstacle” (in 
the voting cases, a “severe” burden). 
 In some ways, the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart69 upholding a federal 
statute outlawing the use of certain abortion procedures is disturbingly similar to its 
decision in Crawford. 
First, in rejecting the idea of a facial, pre-enforcement challenge, the Court failed 
to focus on the group of people actually burdened by the statute. One of the bases for 
the challenge to the federal abortion statute was that it contained no exception for 
cases in which the forbidden procedure was necessary to preserve the health of the 
woman. Prior Supreme Court decisions had required such exceptions.70 (Another 
way of expressing this point is to say that a statute without a health exception placed 
an undue burden on a woman whose health was at stake.) But the Carhart Court held 
that the plaintiffs had not “demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a 
large fraction of relevant cases.”71 The Court seemed to be saying that in cases where 
the prohibited procedure was not necessary to preserve the health of the woman, the 
absence of a health exception would place no health-related burden on the woman. 
But even talking about a “fraction of relevant cases” misses the point: the need for a 
health exception is relevant only when a woman’s health is at risk. The fact that most 
women needing abortions would not be affected by the lack of a health exception 
was true but irrelevant,72 in the same way that the fact that most voters will not be 
affected by an ID requirement says nothing about whether the voters who lack ID are 
severely burdened. And stating that “[t]he Act is open to a proper as-applied chal-
lenge in a discrete case”73 was cold comfort. As with the similar proviso in Crawford, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Id. at 874.  
 68. Id. at 877. The joint opinion’s explanation that a law that, “while furthering the inter-
est in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving 
its legitimate ends,” id., uses terms like “valid state interest” and “legitimate ends” that seem 
far closer to rationality review than to strict scrutiny—which would demand the existence of 
a compelling interest as the prerequisite for upholding a challenged statute. See Emma 
Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue 
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 292 (2013). 
 69. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 70. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006). 
 71. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–68. 
 72. See id. at 188–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (making this point). 
 73. Id. at 168 (Thomas, J., concurring) (making this point). 
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this suggestion left open the question whether each individual burdened would have 
to litigate the question in light of the individual’s particular circumstances—itself a 
significant burden.74 
Second, as it had done in Crawford and Purcell, the Court moved far away from 
heightened scrutiny and into the most deferential form of rationality review. 
Acknowledging that it had “no reliable data,” the Court offered up its conclusion that 
“some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created 
and sustained.”75 There was in fact no more empirical support for that conclusion 
than there had been for the proposition that in-person voter impersonation is an actual 
problem or that any voter decided not to vote because a jurisdiction lacked a voter 
ID law. It was adjudication by anecdote.76 
And as with its assertion that imposing restrictions on the right to vote was actu-
ally vote protective (because it increased public confidence and thus voter turnout),77 
the Carhart Court then sought to couch its approval of restrictions on women’s ac-
cess to abortion as a woman-protective decision: “The State has an interest in ensur-
ing so grave a choice is well informed.”78 Left unexplained is how an outright prohi-
bition on the procedure—rather than, say, truthful information about what the 
procedure entails—can “inform” a choice that the statute forbids the woman and her 
physician from making.79 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures 
for a Structural Theory of the Right To Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 661–62 (2008) 
(discussing what it would mean to have as-applied undue burden challenges to restrictions on 
the right to vote). 
 75. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. Note that the Court never explains whether there is a nec-
essary “connection between regret and a wish to have been precluded from making a choice 
in the first place.” Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts 
Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1395 (2008). 
 76. The sole source cited by the Court was a brief filed on behalf of 180 women. See id. 
at 159 (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 05-380, pp. 22–24). There 
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See Karlan, , supra note 75, at 1394. To the extent there is evidence of regret levels, “[a]bortion 
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rate for abortions hovers around 5%, whereas, for instance, 20% of people regret their tattoos, 
6% regret sterilizations, 20% regret prostate surgery, and a whopping 42.5% regret some as-
pect of their treatment for breast cancer.” Kate L. Fetrow, Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: 
Towards a Holistic Undue Burden Jurisprudence, 70 STAN. L. REV. 319, 340-41 (2018). 
 77. An empirically unsupportable proposition itself. See Stephen Ansolabehere & 
Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the 
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754–60 (2008). 
 78. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. 
 79. For persuasive analysis and criticism of the woman-protective rationales for re-
strictions on access to abortions, see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality 
Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007); Reva 
Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality 
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional 
Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). 
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In announcing the undue burden standards, the Justices continued to give lip 
service to the importance of the rights at stake. But as they applied those standards 
in cases like Crawford, Purcell, Casey, and Carhart, they often seemed to be using 
an approach conventionally applied to restrictions on nonfundamental liberty 
interests. Intermediate forms of scrutiny generally look at whether the 
government’s actual purpose is in fact both “important” and “substantially” served 
by the challenged restriction.80 By contrast, the Justices’ reliance on intuition and 
anecdote resembled far more closely standard rationality review in which “[a] 
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it;”81 it is “entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes 
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the 
legislature.”82 Faced with a conservative political movement bent on rolling back 
protections for both voting rights and abortion rights, this form of undue burden 
review provides little protection. It ignores completely the way in which 
restrictions on voting and on access to abortion actually operate in the lives of real 
people in favor of a stylized vision of the world. 
III. REFRAMING UNDUE BURDENS 
Blindness to the actual burdens a challenged law imposes on voters or women 
who have decided to terminate a pregnancy is not a necessary consequence of adopt-
ing an undue burden standard. Several recent decisions show how courts that are 
sensitive to the realities of the world “out there”83 determine whether a particular law 
imposes a significant burden of the kind that demands judicial skepticism. And those 
courts’ descriptions of how socioeconomic disadvantage transforms what might be 
only minor impediments for more affluent individuals into constitutionally suspect 
burdens offers a vantage point from which to work on the longer-term project of 
persuading the people and the courts that our constitutional values are threatened by 
economic inequality.84 
The two leading judicial discussions of the burdens imposed by the new vote de-
nial appear in cases ultimately resolved under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
which forbids the use of any voting practice or procedure that “results in a denial or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. This is how the standard for intermediate scrutiny is articulated in cases involving sex 
discrimination. See United States v. Virginia, 581 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996) (holding that in 
such cases “a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for 
actions in fact differently grounded”); id. at 533 (explaining that the government “must show 
at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that 
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those ob-
jectives” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal quo-
tations omitted) (alteration in original)). 
 81. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
 82. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (citing U.S. R.R. Retirement 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). 
 83. I borrow the phrase from Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Beal v. Doe, in which he crit-
icized the majority for upholding Pennsylvania’s refusal to fund abortions for poor women as 
part of its Medicaid program. 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 84. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 18 (2017). 
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abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race 
or color” or membership in a language-minority group.85 
In North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,86 the Fourth 
Circuit struck down provisions in a North Carolina omnibus statute that imposed a 
photo ID requirement, cut back on early voting, and eliminated same-day registration 
during the early voting period, out-of-precinct voting on Election Day, and 
preregistration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.87 In describing the burdens the 
omnibus act imposed on African American voters, the Fourth Circuit identified ways 
in which the new regime interacted with socioeconomic disadvantage to restrict the 
right to vote. For example, the elimination of same-day registration undermined the 
ability of citizens with “low literacy skills or other difficulty completing a registra-
tion form to receive personal assistance from poll workers.”88 Pointing to the district 
court’s findings that African Americans in North Carolina were “disproportionately 
likely to move, be poor, less educated, have less access to transportation, and expe-
rience poor health,”89 the Fourth Circuit declared that “[t]hese socioeconomic dis-
parities establish that no mere ‘preference’ led African Americans to 
disproportionately use early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, 
and preregistration. Nor does preference lead African Americans to 
disproportionately lack acceptable photo ID.” Instead, “for many African Americans, 
[the provisions that had been eliminated] are a necessity.”90 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10301(a), 10303(f)(2) (2015). For more general discussions of section 
2 and the new vote denial, see Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: 
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Amendment.  
 86. 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). 
 87. See id. at 242. 
 88. Id. at 217. 
 89. Id. at 233 (quoting N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 
3d 320, 432 (M.D.N.C 2016)). 
 90. Id. The court of appeals also emphasized the interactive nature of the various chal-
lenged provisions. Quoting Justice O’Connor’s observation in Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 
581 (2005), that a “panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered alone, 
may nevertheless have the combined effect of severely restricting participation and competi-
tion,” id. at 607–08 (O’Connor, J., concurring), the court explained that “the photo ID require-
ment inevitably increases the steps required to vote, and so slows the process.” McCrory, 831 
F.3d at 231. Because there were fewer days of early voting, more voters would find it neces-
sary to vote on Election Day. “Together, these produce longer lines at the polls on Election 
Day, and absent out-of-precinct voting, prospective Election Day voters may wait in these 
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Similarly, in striking down Texas’s draconian voter ID law as violative of section 
2, the Fifth Circuit explained why the law’s “burdens” on minority voters were “ex-
cessive”91 by pointing to how the law interacted with socioeconomic conditions. The 
ID requirement fell more heavily on poor citizens, with more than one in five voters 
earning less than $20,000 per year lacking such documentation, nearly ten times the 
rate at which voters earning between $100,000 and $150,000 lacked it. The court of 
appeals pointed to testimony about how the “[u]nreliable and irregular wage work 
and other income” of poor citizens burdened their ability to “locate and bring the 
requisite papers and identity cards, travel to a processing site, wait through the as-
sessment, and get photo identifications.”92 And it explained that “most job opportu-
nities do not include paid sick or other paid leave; taking off from work means lost 
income. Employed low-income Texans not already in possession of such documents 
will struggle to afford income loss from the unpaid time needed to get photo identi-
fication.”93 
Moreover, precisely because poor Texans were less likely to own cars, they had 
less need for driver’s licenses (the primary form of government-issued photo ID). 
For them to travel to a DMV office to get even the formally no-cost election identi-
fication certificate Texas purportedly made available imposed a significant burden: 
“Of eligible voters without access to a vehicle, a large percentage faced trips of three 
hours or more to obtain an [election identification certificate].”94 
Moreover, the court of appeals praised the district judge, Nelva Gonzales Ramos, 
for going beyond just “statistical disparity” to rest its findings on “concrete evidence” 
from individual citizens “regarding the excessive burdens” they faced.95 Those 
stories make for powerful, and powerfully disturbing, reading about the obstacles 
faced by indigent citizens in negotiating everyday life and exercising the rights they 
                                                                                                                 
 
longer lines only to discover that they have gone to the wrong precinct and are unable to travel 
to their correct precincts. Thus, cumulatively, the panoply of restrictions results in greater dis-
enfranchisement than any of the law’s provisions individually.” Id.; see also NAACP State 
Conference of Pa. v. Cortes, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (stating with respect to 
long lines on Election Day that “we would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that many 
individuals have a limited window of opportunity to go to the polls due to their jobs, child care 
and family responsibilities, or other weighty commitments. Life does not stop on election day. 
Many must vote early or in the evening if they are to vote at all”).  For a parallel argument 
with respect to abortion rights, see Fetrow, supra note 76, at 353-54 (criticizing current undue 
burden doctrine in the abortion context for evaluating challenged provisions in isolation and 
failing to take into account the cumulative impact of a state’s entire legal regime on women’s 
access to abortion). 
 91. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 250 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 
(2017). 
 92. Id. at 251. 
 93. Id. 
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R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 
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 95. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 253–54. 
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formally possess. They put meat on the bones of an undue burden standard. The 
framework for analyzing section 2 claims requires courts to look at “the extent to 
which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such 
areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate 
effectively in the political process.”96 Courts analyzing a constitutional undue burden 
claim with regard to the right to vote should do the same.97 
In Planned Parenthood Southeast v. Strange (Strange II),98 Judge Myron H. 
Thompson took a similarly concrete and context-sensitive approach in adjudicating 
a challenge to Alabama’s requirement that a doctor who performs abortions “have 
staff privileges at an acute care hospital within the same standard metropolitan sta-
tistical area” as the facility where he or she performs them.99 In a prior opinion, Judge 
Thompson had laid out a framework for assessing “how ‘significant’ the obstacle 
created by [a] statute is.”100 Among the factors he identified were “the nature and 
circumstances of the women affected by the regulation,”101 and he pointed to “wealth 
and education,” and “any personal factors that may serve to amplify the harms im-
posed by the regulation, such as being in an abusive relationship or lack of legal 
immigration status” as circumstances a court should consider.102 Next, he pointed to 
logistical concerns including the number and geographic distribution of abortion pro-
viders and “travel patterns, access to transportation, and availability of information 
about abortion services.”103 Finally, he pointed to the surrounding “social, cultural, 
and political context” in which women make decisions whether to terminate a preg-
nancy and physicians make decisions whether to provide abortion services.104 
Taking these various factors into account, Judge Thompson concluded that 
Alabama’s staff privileges requirement imposed an undue burden. He found that the 
requirement would drive abortion providers out of Alabama’s three largest cities: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). The Supreme Court incorporated this report into 
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 98. 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
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(M.D. Ala. 2014). 
 101. Id. at 1288. 
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Birmingham, Montgomery, and Mobile.105 This would require women to travel ei-
ther out-of-state or to one of the few in-state providers. 
Judge Thompson’s explanation of the burden that came from the need to travel 
began with the fact that an overwhelming percentage of the woman seeking abortions 
in Alabama were poor.106 His account of the difficulties—financial, logistical, and 
psychological—that flowed from their poverty echoed the account laid out by Judge 
Ramos in the Texas voter ID case. Judge Thompson concluded: 
For these women, going to another city to procure an abortion is partic-
ularly expensive and difficult. Poor women are less likely to own their 
own cars and are instead dependent on public transportation, asking 
friends and relatives for rides, or borrowing cars; they are less likely to 
have internet access; many already have children, but are unlikely to 
have regular sources of child care; and they are more likely to work on 
an hourly basis with an inflexible schedule and without any paid time off 
or to receive public benefits which require regular attendance at meetings 
or classes. A woman who does not own her own car may need to buy two 
inter-city bus tickets (one for the woman procuring the abortion, and one 
for a companion) in order to travel to another city. Without regular inter-
net access, it is more difficult to locate an abortion clinic in another city 
or find an affordable hotel room. The additional time to travel for the city 
requires her to find and pay for child care or to miss one or several days 
of work. Furthermore, at each juncture, a woman may have to tell rela-
tives, romantic partners, or work supervisors why she is leaving town: to 
procure an abortion. . . . Finally, . . . many low-income women have never 
left the cities in which they live. The idea of going to a city where they 
know no one and have never visited, in order to undergo a procedure that 
can be frightening in itself, can present a significant psychological hur-
dle. “[T]his psychological hurdle is as serious a burden as the additional 
costs represented by travel.”107 
And Judge Thompson directly addressed the view of some courts that “obstacles 
that arise from the interactions of regulation with women’s financial constraints, as 
well as other aspects of women's circumstances, [are] ineligible to be ‘substantial 
obstacles’ under Casey.”108 He distinguished the burdens caused by government reg-
ulation from those caused by the government’s failure to remove preexisting barriers 
(for example, by refusing to fund abortions for indigent women). A court, he de-
clared, should not “ignore obstacles aggravated by the realities of poverty.”109 
Most recently, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,110 the Supreme Court 
rejected the idea that the undue burden test is a form of rationality review,111 requir-
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc v. Strange (Strange II), 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1355 (M.D. 
Ala. 2014). 
 106. Id. at 1356 (alteration in original). 
 107. Id. at 1357. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1358. 
 110. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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ing instead that “courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access to-
gether with the benefits those laws confer”112 and determine for themselves whether 
the challenged statute “places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's 
choice.’”113 The Court’s detailed discussion of the lack of evidence of any health 
benefits from the challenged provisions conveyed the message that entirely specula-
tive women-protective rationales cannot counterbalance proven burdens.114 
What cases like McCrory, Veasey, and Strange II show is that undue burden tests, 
in the hands of courts that pay attention to the interactive effects of socioeconomic 
conditions and the challenged restrictions, are not toothless. They can work to vindi-
cate citizens’ rights to vote and women’s access to abortion. Courts can in fact eval-
uate both the strength of the government’s proffered interests and the extent to which 
restricting access to the voting booth or to abortion actually serves those interests. 
And their opinions can educate the public about the significant obstacles poor people 
face in exercising their rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. State Board of Elections115 striking 
down poll taxes offered two reasons for its conclusion that restrictions on the right 
to vote demand more searching judicial review. The first one, familiar to the law 
today, is that the right to vote is fundamental.116 But the second one captures a con-
cern with economic justice: “Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like 
those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”117 Thus, “the requirement of fee paying 
causes an ‘invidious’ discrimination.”118 
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 112. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (emphasis added). 
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 116. Id. at 667. 
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 118. Id. (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), for the proposition that lines drawn on the 
basis of wealth are disfavored). And even though the Harper Court did not directly address 
racial equality, the Justices surely had not forgotten their decision only a year earlier in 
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), where the Court had declared that Virginia’s poll 
tax “was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.” Id. at 543. 
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That traditional disfavor has been unheeded for decades, interred by the Burger 
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.119 But it deserves 
resuscitation, particularly in an era of striking economic inequality. Everyone under-
stands Anatole France’s rightly caustic condemnation of a regime in which citizen-
ship means merely “the majestic quality of the law which prohibits the wealthy as 
well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from being in the streets, and from 
stealing bread.”120 Showing the courts, and the public, how economic disadvantage 
thwarts such foundational rights as voting and access to abortion may allow for a 
new form of stereoscopic understanding, which looks at the intersection of liberty 
interests and economic equality. And perhaps this understanding can radiate outward 
into more general discussions about the ways that individuals’ ability to participate 
fully in American society are constrained by their economic situation and about our 
responsibility as a society to do something about that. 
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